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JURISDICTION 
J urisdiction is pr opei :i i i 1:1 id s : • on 11: t pi ir suai it t : 1 Jtc 1 I C : i = 
Ann, sec t i on. 78 - 2 2 ( 1) and 78 - 2 a - 3 (2) (k) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Wnether a rlose : :\.-. . . atioi ishi p bet/w een the 
property JAI^: • :t:;dar\ by acquiescence case creates a 
iT-nrrri'" + - nrries greater weight as to, nonacquiescence 
. . ^^aui -
2. Whether the district court improperly found that the 
ownei: s of the tw ::> ]:: :i : c perti es prior to 1 967 niutua] ] 3 acquiesced in 
the a. 1 t i f i c i a 1 boundary? 
3. Whether the district courr. improperly found that the 
t wo p r op e 1: t: :i e s • * ) rop e 2: ] 1 1 de d 11 1 a t 
boundary . ac--;..- essence had been established, where the two 
properties are n;t adjoining according to modern contemporary 
Appellee xt-t r~*- contest the statement of the issues as 
presented by appellor ,ellee does contest whether issues 1 
com*. . aii'.i whether r -iey were properly auckeled. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1 . A ; p>:-. . . . 
'Brief of appellant ,u, -eview 01 a ;ria. court''-: conclusions 
of law are based 01 1 a correction of error standard, granting no 
deference 1: : • til: 1 = ti :i a ] c • : n 11 : t: Marcl lai it v , I ai k (Z'li t ,/,, ) ; ] I • 2d 
677, 680 (Utah App, ] 989), aff'd, 788 P 2d 520 (Utah 1990); Lake 
1 
Philcras v. Valley Bank and Trust Company, 845 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
2. Appellant's second issue on appeal attacks a factual 
finding of the trial court. (Brief of appellant at 2) Appellate 
courts reviewing a trial court's findings of fact apply a clearly 
erroneous standard, and will not lightly disturb those findings. 
Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993) . 
An appellant attacking a factual determination has an obligation 
to marshal the evidence in support of the determination made by 
the finder of fact, then demonstrate why it is deficient. 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799, 800 
(Utah 1991); Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). 
3. Appellant's third issue on appeal mixes a challenge of 
a finding of fact and a conclusion of law. Appellate review of 
findings of fact applies a clearly erroneous standard. Alta 
Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993); Von 
Hake v. Thomas 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985) . An appellant 
attacking a factual determination must marshal the evidence in 
support of the determination made by the finder of fact, then 
demonstrate why it is deficient. Crookston v. Fire Insurance 
Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799, 800 (Utah 1991) . Legal conclusions 
are based on a correction of error standard. Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 
P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1994). 
2 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
There a.re no coi i s t i L u t Loiidl p tov J r» i unii, ,sl d'luLes ni i'iuJk\- ul 
central importance, to this appeal. 
STATEMENT /r Ikih uASE 
A - ture oi ..::•._ ~as-_ . . .. . s case in vn 1 ve s own e r L- :: _;. f 
real property locate-i in American Fork, Uta* . -le.Iant claims 
t : -': •' • :< defend~" * ^cur iarv '••• r-|uiescence. 
B. Statement oi: r'a^  . . .. property present.; ^ n 
dispute between :. ;\.e ;. arties was once part c: a larger parcel cf 
p r o p e i: t: y o v n 1 e a ID } A n a i: e w i i J i i e") t : < 11 :5 i i s i \ ,; i i :i i : s \ t ft 11 a r e w 
Pulley conveyed approximately one acre of the proper ty to hi s son 
Adolphus Pulley, (R at 310) In 1946, Andrew Pulley conveyed 
a l ] • ^ 'operty !:: : 1 :i :ii s da/i lghter defendan t Mary 
Pullc. .'he properL ; was deeded to defendant Mary Pulley using 
the fallowing leoa: :escription: 
beginning ^- L.II-« ^enter of sectiw^ ^ ,^ . . ,,, .^A-IIL... 
south, Range 2 east, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; cnence 
•  ir 27.15 chains; thence south 85 56' west 6.18 chains; 
Liience north 4.58 chains; thence west 3.28 chains; thence 
north 2,50 chains; thence west 4.0C chains; thence north 
^.0 0 chains; thence east 2 5,00 chains; thence south 6.50 
chains; thence east 15.00 chains; thence south 20.00 chains 
to place of beginning. Area 75.85 acres more or less. (R. 
ar 31C- 3 0 9 
The property carved out of the larger Andrew Pulley parcel 
and ccnveypi re Ado'rhus Fu; \*-*\ by his father andrew was 
des< -• . I! -
, i.u it;.-DU chains North of the Southwest corner of the 
-west quarter of Section 18, Township 5 south, Range 2 
L of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 2.50 
cnains East 4,0J chains; thence south 2,50 chains; thence 
wes*- 1 :n -:h'-a::v *-~ *-u~ ^ n c e of begi nn :i ng. Area ] 0 acres. 
3 
Plaintiff eventually came to purchase the 1 acre parcel 
originally conveyed to Adolphus Pulley. Defendant Mary Pulley 
eventually transferred much of her property received from her 
father Andrew, but retained the portion which abuts plaintiff's 
property. (R. at 240) Because the legal descriptions of Mary 
Pulley's parcel and plaintiff's parcel commenced from different 
starting points, there is a description gap between the 
properties. (R. at 0412-0415) None of the remaining property 
has been deeded to other parties. (R. at 0416) Despite the 
description gap, plaintiff possesses the amount of property which 
Adolphus Pulley originally deeded to Andrew Pulley. (R. at 0416-
0418) 
Adolphus Pulley held the property which he was deeded by his 
father until he died. The property was then held by Thelma 
Pulley, Adolphus' wife, until 1967 (R. at 240) . Trees were 
planted along the boundary between the properties in 
approximately 1944. (R. at 0468) (R. at 499) The area between 
the 1940's tree and fence line, and the legal description is the 
area in dispute in this matter. (R. at 308) 
In 1967, Thelma Pulley sold her property to Lewis and 
Caroline Madsen. (R. at 24 0) The Madsens conveyed the property 
to Charles and Zena Boyer in 1973. (R. at 240) The Boyers sold 
the property to Plaintiff in 1979. Plaintiff and Defendant both 
claim ownership of the disputed property. (R. at 17) 
C. Proceedings Below: 
Plaintiff filed this action for quiet title and trespass on 
4 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes or rules of 
central importance to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: This case involves ownership of 
real property located in American Fork, Utah. Appellant claims 
title by deed, defendant by boundary by acquiescence. 
B. Statement of Facts: All of the property presently in 
dispute between the parties was once part of a larger parcel of 
property owned by Andrew Pulley. (R. at 311-310) In 1934, Andrew 
Pulley conveyed approximately one acre of the property to his son 
Adolphus Pulley. (R. at 310) In 1946, Andrew Pulley conveyed 
all the remainder of his property to his daughter defendant Mary 
Pulley. The property was deeded to defendant Mary Pulley using 
the following legal description: 
Beginning at the center of section of Section 18, Township 5 
south, Range 2 east, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence 
west 27.15 chains; thence south 85 56' west 6.18 chains; 
thence north 4.58 chains; thence west 3.28 chains; thence 
north 2.50 chains; thence west 4.00 chains; thence north 
7.00 chains; thence east 25.00 chains; thence south 6.50 
chains; thence east 15.00 chains; thence south 20.00 chains 
to place of beginning. Area 75.85 acres more or less. (R. 
at 310-309) 
The property carved out of the larger Andrew Pulley parcel 
and conveyed to Adolphus Pulley by his father andrew was 
described in that deed as follows: 
Beginning 16.50 chains North of the Southwest corner of the 
Northwest quarter of Section 18, Township 5 south, Range 2 
East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 2.50 
chains East 4.00 chains; thence south 2.50 chains; thence 
west 4.00 chains to the place of beginning. Area 1.0 acres 
3 
the court below. (Brief of appellant at 1) Plaintiff argues 
that this issue was raised implicitly at the trial level. (R. at 
550-551) (See Appendix III) 
Plaintiff's second issue alleges there was no acquiescence 
to the boundary between the parties real property prior to 1967. 
(Brief of appellant at 2) Again, plaintiff failed to preserve 
this issue in the court below. And cigain, plaintiff claims to 
have preserved the issue implicitly, and also by pre-trial 
memorandum. (Brief of Appellant at 2) (R. at 550-551, 102-101) 
(See Appendix III) Examination of the record reveals neither 
plaintiff's first or second issue on appeal was ever raised or 
preserved in the trial court. Plaintiff now urges the court to 
consider these issues for the first time on appeal. (R. at 550-
551, 102-101) (See Appendix III) 
Utah law precludes consideration of appellate issues which 
were not first raised in the court below. Because plaintiff's 
first two issues were not raised or preserved, they cannot be 
considered. Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 
645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982); James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 
801-02 (Utah App. 1987). 
Failing to raise or preserve her first two issues in the 
trial court, plaintiff also failed to preserve the issues in her 
docketing statement. Plaintiff did not file an amended docketing 
statement, denying defendant the opportunity to file a motion for 
summary disposition on the issues which were not docketed. (See 
Rules 9, 10, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure) Issues not 
6 
June 21, 1994. (R. at 3-1) Defendant/Appellee answered and 
filed a counterclaim on August 11, 1994. (R. at 23-16) 
Plaintiff answered the counterclaim on September 8, 1994. (R. at 
27) Plaintiff filed a summary judgment motion on March 14, 1995. 
(R. at 51-50) The motion was denied on May 5, 1995. (R. at 120) 
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on November 9, 
1995, which was denied on January 2, 1996. (R. at 176-175, 276-
275) A bench trial was held on March 21, 1996. (R. at 323-565) 
Findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment were entered 
for the defendants on May 21, 1996. (R. at 311-303) Plaintiff 
filed this appeal. (R. at 318-317) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This matter is an appeal from a verdict quieting title to 
disputed real property in appellee Mary Pulley (hereinafter 
defendant), on her counterclaim based on boundary by 
acquiescence. (R. at 316-303) The appeal in this matter was 
filed based solely on appellant's (hereinafter plaintiff) third 
issue on appeal, the only issue set forth in the docketing 
statement. (See plaintiff's docketing statement) Subsequently, 
plaintiff filed her brief on appeal which sets forth two 
additional issues - - issues which were not set forth in the 
docketing statement. 
Plaintiff's first appellate issue - - which alleges a 
presumption against boundary by acquiescence where adjoining 
property owners are related - - was not raised or preserved in 
5 
1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Because plaintiff failed to 
marshal the evidence, the finding of the trial court should be 
upheld. 
Defendant has marshalled the evidence supporting the finding 
of the trial court, and it is apparent that the evidence supports 
the trial court finding. Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage et. 
al., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1994) . (See Appendix I for 
marshalling.) 
Plaintiff's final issue on appeal is: "Whether the district 
court improperly found that the two properties were adjoining, 
and improperly concluded that boundary by acquiescence had been 
established, where the two properties are not adjoining according 
to legal description." (Brief of Appellant at 2) This issue is 
a mixed question of fact and law. The trial court found that the 
parties are adjoining landowners. (R. at 307) The factual 
challenge requires marshalling of the evidence. Utah Dept. of 
Social Services, at 1197. Again, plaintiff has failed to marshal 
the evidence so it has been marshalled by defendant Mary Pulley. 
(See Appendix II) Failure to marshal the evidence requires 
support of the trial court finding, and corresponding legal 
conclusion. Lake Philgas v. Valley Bank and Trust Company, 845 
P.2d 951, 955 (Utah App. 1993), quoting Saunders v. Sharp. 806 
P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). 
Because of plaintiff's failure to preserve the first two 
issues for appeal, the failure to cite authority for the issues, 
the failure to marshal the evidence, and the adequacy of the 
8 
properly appealed and preserved in a docketing statement, cannot 
be considered on appeal. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut, 
Auto Ins. Co., 882 P.2d 1143, 1144 (footnote 1) (Utah 1994). 
Assuming arguendo that plaintiff's first issue is properly 
before the court, that issue is: "Whether a close family 
relationship between the property owners in a boundary by 
acquiescence case creates a presumption of, or carries greater 
weight as to, nonacquiescence in the artificial boundary." 
Plaintiff cites no authority on point from any jurisdiction 
in support of her argument, but instead argues adverse 
possession, and prescriptive easement cases by analogy. (Brief 
of Appellant at 9-10) Plaintiff's argument displays a basic 
misunderstanding of the peaceful nature of boundary by 
acquiescence, and the hostile nature of adverse possession and 
prescriptive easement. Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 
1990) quoting Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725, 726 (1974); Olwell v. 
Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 587 (Utah 1982). If anything, the fact that 
property owners on opposite sides of a boundary are related 
strengthens rather than weakens the likelihood of acquiescence in 
a property boundary. 
Plaintiff's second issue on appeal is: "Whether the district 
court improperly found that the owners of the two properties 
prior to 1967 mutually acquiesced in the artificial boundary?" 
(Brief of appellant at 2) This issue is a challenge to a factual 
finding of the trial court which requires marshalling of the 
evidence. Utah Department of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 
7 
aware that a different standard should be considered. (R. at 
550-551) (See Appendix III) 
Plaintiff also failed to raise or preserve at the trial 
level the second issue on appeal. The issue is: "Whether the 
district court improperly found that the owners of the two 
properties prior to 1967 mutually acquiesced in the artificial 
boundary?" (Brief of Appellant at P.2) Plaintiff claims the 
issue was raised implicitly at trial and in plaintiff's reply 
memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment. (R. at 
550-551, 102-101) (See Appendix III) As with the previous issue 
on appeal, plaintiff claims to rely on an implicit conclusory 
argument of plaintiff's counsel to claim that the issue was 
preserved for appeal. 
At trial, plaintiff's counsel claimed that there was never 
an argument as to who owned the disputed property. He did not 
make any argument that there was not acquiescence in the 
boundary. (R. at 550) Upon examination of the record it is 
evident that the issue was never raised or preserved. 
Plaintiff also claims that the argument was preserved in a 
reply memorandum filed prior to trial. (Brief of appellant at 
p. 2) The argument in the reply memorandum could not have 
preserved the issue for appeal. First, the issue which plaintiff 
has argued on appeal deals with acquiescence in the boundary 
prior to 1967. (Brief of Appellant at 2) The argument in 
plaintiff's reply memorandum deals exclusively with acquiescence 
between plaintiff and the defendant Mary Pulley. (R. at 102-
10 
findings and conclusions of the trial court, plaintiff cannot 
prevail on her appeal. Such glaring deficiencies conclude that 
this appeal is frivolous. Defendant should be awarded her 
attorney's fees and costs. (See Rule 33 Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure) 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO RAISE OR PRESERVE IN THE COURT BELOW HER 
FIRST TWO ISSUES FOR APPEAL. 
Plaintiff in her brief has raised two points for appeal 
which were not set forth in her docketing statement, and most 
importantly, were not preserved for appeal in the court below. 
Plaintiff states the first of these issues as: "Whether a 
close family relationship between the property owners in a 
boundary by acquiescence case creates a presumption of, or 
carries greater weight as to, nonacquiescence in the artificial 
boundary." (Brief of Appellant at 1) Plaintiff claims that this 
issue was raised implicitly at the trial level. (R. at 550-551) 
(See Appendix III) Examination of the references to the record 
cited by plaintiff make it evident that this issue was never 
preserved for appeal. The record at 550-551 contains a portion 
of plaintiff's counsel's argument at the conclusion of the trial. 
In his argument, Plaintiff's counsel makes no argument whatsoever 
that the presumptions regarding family relationships should 
change, or that there is a different standard for boundary by 
acquiescence where family members are present on opposing sides 
of a boundary. No direct authority is cited in support of the 
plaintiff's position, and no effort is made to make the court 
9 
II. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESERVE HER FIRST TWO ISSUES ON APPEAL 
IN HER DOCKETING STATEMENT. 
In addition to failing to raise or preserve the first two 
issues for appeal in the trial court, plaintiff also failed to 
preserve those issues in her docketing statement. In support of 
her failure to docket the issues, plaintiff cites Nelson by and 
through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City 919 P. 2d 568, 572 (Utah 
1996). In Nelson, an appellant was allowed to pursue issues on 
appeal which were not preserved in the original docketing 
statement. In that case an amended docketing statement was filed 
which raised the additional issues. In the case at bar, there 
has been no amended docketing statement filed, and therefore the 
issues have not been preserved. If plaintiff is allowed to 
pursue her first two issues on appeal, without raising them in 
the docketing statement, or filing an amended docketing 
statement, defendant Mary Pulley will be prejudiced because she 
has been denied the opportunity to file a motion for summary 
disposition on issues which were not docketed. (See Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure rule 10) 
In Dairvland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut, Auto Ins. Co., 882 
P.2d 1143, 1144 (footnote 1) (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court 
refused to consider issues on appeal which were not properly 
appealed and docketed as follows: 
. . . Although the Anopols' counsel raised this argument in 
their brief on appeal, they neglected to appeal this issue 
by filing a notice of appeal and a docketing statement, and 
we therefore decline to consider it. See Utah R. App. P. 3 
8c 9. 
Because plaintiff's first two issues were not preserved for 
12 
101) (See Appendix III) Plaintiff did not purchase her property 
until 1979. (R. at 332) There could be no acquiescence between 
the parties prior to plaintiff's purchase of her property. This 
argument could not have preserved the issue for appeal. 
This court has set forth specific standards for preservation 
of issues for appeal. In LeBaron v. Rebel Enterprises, Inc., 
823 P.2d 479, 482, 483 (Utah App. 1991), this court stated: 
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must 
timely bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, 
thus providing the court an opportunity to rule on the 
issue's merits. See Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis 
Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982); James v. 
Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801-02 (Utah App. 1987). "Issues not 
raised in the trial court in timely fashion are deemed 
waived, precluding [the appellate court] from considering 
their merits on appeal." Salt Lake County v. Carlson,776 
P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1989); accord Barson v. E.R. Sguibb 
& Sons, Inc.,, 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, 
v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). 
Further, the mere mention of an issue in the pleadings, when 
no supporting evidence or relevant legal authority is 
introduced at trial in support of the claim, is insufficient 
to raise an issue at trial and thus insufficient to preserve 
the issue for appeal. James, 746 P.2d at 801. This rule is 
"'stringently applied when the new theory depends on 
controverted factual questions whose relevance thereto was 
not made to appear at trial'." Id, (Quoting Bogacki v. Board 
of Supervisors, 5 Cal. 3rd 771, 489 P.2d 537, 543-44, 97 Cal 
RPTR. 657, 663-64 (1971) cert, denied, 405 U.S. 1030, 92 S. 
Ct. 1301 (1972)). 
Examination of the record as designated by Plaintiff, (R. at 550-
551, 102-101) makes it evident that the plaintiff has failed to 
preserve the first two issues in her brief for appeal. Those 
issues cannot be considered by the court. 
11 
mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary. Plaintiff argues 
that there should be a presumption against acquiescence where the 
parties on the two sides of the disputed boundary are related. 
At trial, plaintiff offered no evidence disputing the claim that 
the line in question was treated as a boundary during the period 
it was owned by Adolphus Pulley and his wife on one side, and 
defendant Mary Pulley, or her predecessor in interest on the 
other. The only evidence regarding whether the line was 
acquiesced in as a boundary was offered by defendant Mary Pulley. 
(R. at 467 to 471, 473 to 477, 486 to 490, 493 to 495, 500 to 
504) 
Plaintiff cites no authority from Utah or any other 
jurisdiction in support of her argument for a higher standard 
where persons on opposite sides of a boundary are related. This 
lack of citation occurs because there is no authority in support 
of Plaintiff's position. 
Because of the lack of authority in boundary by acquiescence 
cases, Plaintiff attempts to argue adverse possession and 
prescriptive easement cases by analogy. Such argument 
demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the doctrines of 
boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession. 
Boundary by acquiescence is a peaceful doctrine. It is 
based on the premise that sometime in the fairly distant past, 
adjoining property owners implicitly agreed on a boundary. In 
Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 423 (Utah 1990) the court 
stated as follows: 
14 
appeal or docketed, they cannot be considered by the Court. 
III. UTAH LAW HAS NO PRESUMPTION OF NONACQUIESCENCE BETWEEN 
FAMILY MEMBERS. 
Plaintiff's first argument in her brief alleges that a close 
family relationship between property owners creates a presumption 
of nonacquiescence in a boundary. (Brief of appellant at 1) 
Assuming arguendo that this issue were properly preserved for 
appeal, review of a trial court's conclusions of law must be 
based on a correction of error standard, granting no deference to 
the trial court. Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 680 (Utah 
App. 1989), aff'd, 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990); Lake Philaas v. 
Valley Bank and Trust Company, 845 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah App. 
1993) . 
In her brief, plaintiff correctly sets forth the elements of 
boundary by acquiescence which when satisfied create a 
presumption of ownership of the subject property. Enqlert v. 
Zane, 848 P.2d 165, 168-169 (Utah App. 1993). Those elements 
are: 
1. Occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, 
fences, or buildings. 
2. Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary. 
3. Acquiescence for a period of at least 20 years. 
4. The acquiescence in a boundary must be for a period of 
at least 2 0 years. Jacobs v. Hafen, 9] 7 P.2d 3 078, 
1081 (Utah 1996). 
In her first argument under point I of her brief, plaintiff 
concentrates I argument on the second element set forth above: 
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cooperative, making claims of open, notorious hostile possession 
more difficult to prove. Because families are presumed to get 
along and cooperate there is a presumption that they are not 
adverse to one another for purposes of adverse possession. Smith 
v. Smith, 511 P.2d 294, 300 (Idaho 1973). 
If an analogy can be drawn from the cases cited by 
plaintiff, the analogy strengthens the argument that members of a 
family would agree on the location of a boundary. 
IV. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE, THEREFORE FACTUAL 
DETERMINATIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE BEYOND CHALLENGE. 
Plaintiff's second point on appeal asks: "Whether the 
district court improperly found that the owners of the two 
properties prior to 1967 mutually acquiesced in the artificial 
boundary." (Brief of appellant at p. 2) Although this issue is 
subject to a marshalling standard, plaintiff's brief is an 
attempt to retry this matter before the appellate court based on 
selected facts set forth by the plaintiff without marshalling the 
evidence. Because the plaintiff is challenging the factual 
findings of the trial court, she is held to a marshalling 
standard. Christensen v. Munns 812 P. 2d 69, 72-73 (Utah App. 
1991); Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987). 
Although she failed to marshal the evidence, plaintiff's 
brief makes it evident that she is attempting to revisit the 
factual issues of the case rather than examining, as a matter of 
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law, whether the findings of fact contained within the trial 
court's findings support the conclusions of law made by the trial 
court. (Brief of Appellant 11-14) This is why defendant's brief 
is full of citations to various parts of the record, and is 
barren of case law. 
When an appellant is challenging the sufficiency of the 
findings of fact of a trial court, a marshalling standard always 
applies. In Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage et. al., 872 P.2d 
1051, 1052-1053 (Utah App. 1994) this court stated: 
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual 
findings lightly. We repeatedly have set forth the heavy 
burden appellants must bear when challenging factual 
findings. To successfully appeal a trial court's findings 
of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 
"[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the client's 
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order 
to properly discharge the [marshalling] duty ..., the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists," 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah App. 1991); accord In re Estate of Bartell. 776 P.2d 
885, 886 (Utah 1989); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987); Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 
29, 36 (Utah App. 1993); Ohline Corp v. Granite Mill, 849 
P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993). Once appellants have 
established every pillar supporting their adversary's 
position, they then "must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence" and show why those pillars fail to support the 
trial court's findings. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1314. 
They must show the trial court's findings are "so lacking in 
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' 
thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Bartell, 776 P.2d at 
886 (quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193). 
Oneida at 1052-1053. 
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Because defendant has failed to marshal the evidence, this 
court cannot consider any factual issues on appeal. "If the 
evidence is not properly marshalled, we will assume the findings 
are supported and proceed to review the accuracy of the lower 
court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the 
case." Lake Philgas, at 955, quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P. 2d 
198, 199 (Utah 1991) . 
Because this issue is based on a marshalling standard, and 
plaintiff failed to marshal the evidence, defendant Mary Pulley 
has marshalled the evidence on this point. (See Marshalled 
Evidence Appendix I.) The factual findings of the trial court 
are as follows: (Numbering from original) 
6. Part of Defendant's 75.85 acre property was 
immediately north of and adjacent to Plaintiff's 
property. 
7. In the 1940s, trees and bushes were planted 
and a fence erected along the tree and bush line 
between Plaintiff's and Defendant's properties. The 
fence/tree line marked the boundary line between the 
Plaintiff's property on the north and the Defendant's 
property on the south. 
8. From at least 1946 to 1979--some 33 years--
Adolphus Pulley and each succeeding owner of the 
Plaintiff's property from Adolphus Pulley to Charles 
and Xenna Boyer considered and acquiesced to the 
fence/tree line as the boundary line between the 
Plaintiff's and the Defendant's properties. 
9. From at least 1946 to 1979--some 33 years-
Defendant Mary Pulley considered and acquiesced to the 
fence/tree line as the boundary line between the 
Plaintiff's and the Defendant's properties. 
18 
10. From 194 6 to present, Defendant Mary Pulley 
has occupied, possessed, maintained and cared for the 
property immediately north of the fence/tree line. 
11. From 1946 to present, Defendant Mary Pulley 
has used the property immediately north of the 
fence/tree line for family and community events. 
12. For at least 33 years prior to Plaintiff's 
ownership of her property, the fence/tree line 
established the boundary line between the parties' 
properties. 
13. The fence/tree line between the parties' 
properties has been clearly visible since at least 
1946. 
Upon review of the marshalled evidence, and the findings of 
fact of the trial court, it is evident that the owners of the 
real property on each side of the disputed boundary acquiesced in 
the boundary prior to 1967. (R. at 315-314) Upon examining the 
marshalled evidence set forth in Appendix I, it is evident that 
there is a solid basis in the evidence for each Finding of Fact 
set forth above. Because they are supported by the record, and 
because they have not been properly challenged, the findings of 
the trial court must stand. 
V. THE PARTIES TO THIS ACTION ARE ADJOINING LANDOWNERS. 
Plaintiff's final point on appeal is that boundaiy by 
acquiescence is not applicable to the case at bar, as a matter of 
law, because there is a description gap evident between the two 
properties. This challenge comes despite the finding by the 
trial court that the parties are adjoining property owners. (R. 
at 316-304, 302-299) 
To properly challenge the trial court's factual finding, 
plaintiff is obligated to marshal the evidence supporting the 
trial court's conclusion, then demonstrate why the finding of the 
trial court is erroneous. Christensen v. Munns 812 P.2d 69, 72-
73 (Utah App. 1991); Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 
1987) . Although she is attacking a finding of the trial court, 
plaintiff has again failed to marshal the evidence. (See 
argument regarding marshalling requirement in Point IV above); 
(R. at 309 - 304, R. at 302-299) Because the plaintiff again 
failed to marshal the evidence, the defendant Mary Pulley has 
marshalled the evidence in favor of the findings of the trial 
court. (See Appendix II.) 
A close reading of Utah cases demonstrates that when a court 
is determining whether parties are adjoining property owners for 
purposes of boundary by acquiescence, the primary consideration 
is whether the parcels of property are contiguous. In Staker v. 
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1990) the court stated: 
It is clear that the fourth requirement, that there be 
adjoining landowners, has been met in this case. Although 
the various diagrams and maps before the trial court differ 
somewhat, they all reflect that the parcels involved are 
contiguous. . . . 
Black's Law Dictionary uses the following description for the 
term contiguous: 
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Contiguous: In close proximity; neighboring; adjoining; 
near in succession; in actual close contact; touching at a 
point or along a boundary; bounded or traversed by. 
In this matter, the court in its findings of fact found that the 
parties are adjoining landowners. The findings of the trial 
court fit the above definition very well. The trial court 
specifically found as follows: (Numbering from original) 
18. A comparison of the legal descriptions of 
Plaintiff's and Defendant's properties shows that the 
respective deeds unintentionally created a narrow 
description gap between the parties' properties to the 
north and east of the Plaintiff's property. 
19. The parties' legal descriptions were created 
from two different marker points of beginning which 
resulted in the description gap. 
20. The narrow strip of land creating the 
description gap between the parties' properties was an 
unintentional and mistaken result of the property 
description process. 
21. Although surveys and legal descriptions show 
a gap between the parties' properties, the gap was 
originally part of the Andrew Pulley property which was 
subsequently transferred to Defendant Mary Pulley. 
22. Upon Andrew Pulley's transfer to Defendant 
Mary Pulley of his property, Adolphus and his sister 
Defendant Mary Pulley became adjoining landowners on 
the north side of Plaintiff's property. 
23. Plaintiff's property and Defendant's property 
have been adjoining and are adjoining lots from 1936 to 
present. 
(R. at 307) 
The marshalled evidence by Defendant set forth above, supports 
the trial court's finding that the parties are adjoining 
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landowners. Because the factual findings are fully supported by 
the marshalled evidence, and have not been challenged, they must 
be upheld. Having found that the parties are adjoining 
landowners, the trial court had no choice but to conclude that 
boundary by acquiescence had been proven by defendant. 
VI. DEFENDANT MARY PULLEY IS ENTITLED TO HER COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR DEFENDING AGAINST A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL. 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides as 
follows: 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a 
first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court 
determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these 
rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as 
defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the 
prevailing party. The court may order that the damages be 
paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a 
frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that 
is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or 
not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other 
paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed 
for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless 
increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or 
other paper. 
In the case at bar, Plaintiff's first issue was not 
preserved in the trial court or in her docketing statement. For 
these reasons alone it should not be considered. (See Points I 
and II above.) Assuming arguendo that the issue was properly 
preserved, plaintiff has cited no authority from Utah or any 
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other jurisdiction directly on point in favor of her argument, 
and has argued a presumption which has never existed in Utah law. 
(See Brief of Appellant at 7-11) Instead, plaintiff has argued 
the opposite doctrines of adverse possession and prescriptive 
easement in an attempt to bolster her case. 
Plaintiff's second argument on appeal was not preserved in 
the court below or in the docketing statement. (See Points I and 
II above.) Assuming arguendo that the issue is properly before 
this court, it has been argued by incorrectly applying the 
standard of review. (See Brief of Appellant at 11-14) The 
argument is clearly an attack on the factual findings of the 
trial court, yet there is no marshalling. Standing alone, 
failure to marshal is sufficient for the court to refuse to 
consider an issue. (See Point IV above) Instead, plaintiff 
attempts to re-litigate the case using citations to the record 
which she believes are favorable to her. Further, he entire 
argument does not contain a single case supporting plaintiff's 
position on the issue. (See Brief of Appellant at I114) 
Plaintiff's final argument is an another attack on the 
factual findings of the trial court, again with no marshalling of 
the evidence. (See Brief of Appellant at 14-15) Plai ntiff 
ignores the findings of the trial court, arid strains at a unique 
interpretation of the "adjoining landowners" requirement of 
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boundary by acquiescence. Again, plaintiff argues only by 
analogy as there are no Utah cases directly on point. 
Considering all of the above factors, it is evident that 
this appeal is frivolous, and that plaintiff cannot prevail on 
the issues she has briefed. Further, plaintiff's failure to 
marshal the evidence as required by the proper standard of review 
for the issues she has briefed has required the marshalling to be 
done by defendant Mary Pulley. Responding to issues which were 
not raised or preserved below, and marshalling the evidence 
because it was not done by plaintiff, has significantly increased 
defendant Mary Pulley's attorney's fees and costs for responding 
to this appeal. Defendant should be awarded her costs and 
attorney's fees. 
In many ways this matter resembles Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 
414, 416-417 (Utah 1990). In the Hunt case, the plaintiff 
pursued an appeal upon which she could not prevail. The court 
held that pursuing such an appeal violated Rule 3 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court further held that the 
issue of frivolity of the appeal was sufficiently raised in the 
appellee's brief. In Hunt defendant was awarded double costs and 
attorney's fees. 
Under these facts of this case, it is appropriate that this 
matter be considered a frivolous appeal, and that defendant Mary 
24 
Pulley be awarded double costs and attorney's fees pursuant to 
rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants request that the 
Court affirm the decision of the trial court and Quiet Title in 
Defendant Mary Pulley. Additionally, because Plaintiff failed to 
preserve her first two issues at the trial level, briefed issues 
which were not docketed, failed to marshal the evidence, and 
failed to cite authority in support of her third points on 
appeal, Defendants are entitled to their attorneys fees and costs 
based on a frivolous appeal. 
DATED this ^j^Jj day of December, 1997. 
FISHER, SCRIBNER & STIRLAND, P.C. 
BY $Jk c*C 
T. MCKAY 9QKRLAND 
DONALD E. McCANDLESS 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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Plaintiff's second issue for appeal deals with whether the 
district court improperly found that the owners of the two 
properties prior to 1967 mutually acquiesced in the boundary 
between the properties. This issue is a challenge to the factual 
findings of the District Court. Whenever a challenge is made to 
factual findings, the party challenging the factual determination 
has the obligation to marshal the evidence in favor of the 
proposition, then demonstrate why the finding was incorrect. 
(Christensen v. Munns 812 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1991) . 
Because plaintiff has failed to marshal the evidence, 
defendant has marshalled the evidence to demonstrate that the 
finding of the trial court should be upheld. Because the 
plaintiff has only challenged one of the elements of boundary by 
acquiescence, only facts relevant to that element will be 
marshalled. Further, Plaintiff's challenge to the findings of 
fact is only directed to the time period prior to 1967, 
therefore, only findings dealing with events prior to 1967 will 
be marshalled. 
1. John Pulley who was 97 years old at the time of trial 
was the first witness to testify regarding acquiescence during 
the time period in question. (R. at 464.) Mr. Pulley was born 
in an adobe house on the property owned by Defendant Mary Pulley. 
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Mr. Pulley lived on the property from the time Defendant Mary 
Pulley's home was built in 1911, until he moved in 1965. (R. at 
464, 465) In 1965, Mr. Pulley moved to a property nearby. (R. at 
465) Mr. Pulley testified about acquiescence in the boundary as 
follows: (Quote from 0467 line 25 to 0471 line 13) 
Page 0467 line 25 
Q. Did Adolphus and Mary or Adolphus and your father ever 
establish a boundary between their two properties? 
A. Yes, it was established. At that time I don't know 
just where it would be right exactly now, but it was established 
at that time. 
Q. What did they use to establish it? 
A. Well, they had trees and --well, there's grass and 
trees are just about the main. 
Q. What kind of trees are they? 
A. Juniper. 
Q. Did they ever plant any pine trees along that border? 
A. Well, on the south border where Adolf lived they put a 
row along there, yes. 
Q. Did they ever put any trees between Adolphus' property 
on the north and Mary's property? 
A. Yes, that was planted into trees along there. 
Q. And were those same trees still there? 
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A. All except for one, and that blew over here about two 
months ago in a windstorm. 
Q. But do you remember about when those trees were 
planted? 
A. They was planted in 1944. 
Q. And you lived at the home until the 1960's, correct, at 
the old Pulley home? 
A. Yes. I lived there until I got married, and of course 
I moved. 
Q. While you were living there, did you treat those trees 
as the boundary between the farm property ad Adolphus' property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did Adolphus treat that as the boundary line to his 
property, also? 
A. Well, yeah, I think so. I would say it was recognized 
as a boundary. 
Q. By whom? 
A, By my father who owned the rest of the farm. 
Q. And did Adolphus also recognize that boundary? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And did he care for the property up to that boundary 
line? 
A. Yes, Adolf took care of that. 
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Q. And did your father and you and the rest of your family 
take care of the farm around it? 
A. Of course the farm around it would be all the farm east 
of there, yes. 
Q. Who took care of the property between north of 
Adolphus' property and south of the home -- your home? 
A. Mary took care of that. 
Q. Was she living in the home at that time? 
A. Yes, at that time. 
Q. Has she lived there all of her life? 
A. Well, until she went on a mission. 
Q. Except for her mission? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. How old is she now? 
A. She's 96 years old. 
Q. And she took care of that piroperty all the way up to 
the boundary line by Adolphus'? 
A. That's right. 
Q. How did she take care of it? What did she do? 
A. Well, to take care of, of course, she had mowing 
equipment -- she rode the mower to cut the grass, and she put in 
a sprinkling system there to sprinkle the land so it didn't take 
so much work to water the trees and that. 
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Q. Did she take pretty good care of that property? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. Was the grass usually green? 
A. Yeah, it's always green. 
Q. And she would usually cut the grass? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how long did she do that for? 
A. Well, she did that up until about six years ago. 
Q. Did you know of any discussion by anybody, or did you 
ever observe any boundary dispute between that property and 
Adolphus' property? 
A. Well, no. There's a division of trees, but they are 
still there now. 
Q. But you didn't observe any dispute as to the boundary 
there? 
A. No. 
2. The second witness regarding the period prior to 1967 
was Ron Pulley, a son of Adolphus Pulley, who was one of 
Plaintiff's predecessors in interest. Mr. Pulley lived on the 
property now held by Plaintiff from 1943 to 1962, and visited the 
property regularly for several years after that. (R. at 473 line 
25 to 0475 line 4) Mr. Pulley testified about the property line 
as follows: (Quote 0475 line 5 through line 22), 0476 line 19 
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through 0477 line 7) (R. at 0484 line 14 through line 25) 
Page 0475 Line 5 
Q. While you were living there, was there any division 
between your property or your father's property -- your parents' 
property and Mary Pulley's property? 
A. Yes, there was. The division was the tree line, and we 
also had a fence that fenced in all the backyard. 
Q. And was there a fence along the north side of your 
property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And between the south end and Mary Pulley's? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. What is your earliest recollection of that fence or 
tree line being there? 
A. Well, it was always there. You know, I asked my father 
about it, you know, what was our property and what was Aunt 
Mary's property, and that was the dividing 1 ine, that was the 
property line. 
Page 0476 Line 19 
Q. Was there a fence between your property and Mary 
Pulley's property? 
A. Yes, there was. 
Q. And is it in approximately the same place as where the 
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fence is located now? 
A. It's exactly the same place. 
Q. When was the last time you were out on the property? 
A. I go there all the time. It would have been days, 
weeks. 
Q. And is the fence that's there now pretty much in the 
same spot as it was when you were growing up as a boy? 
A. Yes, the tree line is still there. 
Page 0484 Line 14 
Q. When you came home from your mission in 1962 or 1963, 
whenever it was, was the fence still there? 
A. It's always been there. 
Q. And was it still there then? 
A. As far as I could--
Q. Was it still there when you got married? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you get married? 
A. In 1965. 
Q. So the fence was there during your lifetime, as far as 
you know, from 1943 until 1965? 
A. Yeah, ut's always been there. 
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3. The next witness was Julie James, a sister of Ron 
Pulley, and daughter of Adolphus Pulley. Ms. James resided on 
Plaintiff's property beginning in 1947. (R. at 0486) (Quote 0486 
line 24 through 0490 line 19. 0493 line 22 through 0495 line 7) 
Page 0486 Line 24 
Q. Do you have any recollection of a boundary line or a 
fence line or a tree line or something between your parents' 
property and Mary Pulley's property? 
A. There was always a very definite line on the north and 
the south, and it was very definite. 
Q. What did it consist of? 
A. It consisted of pine trees, bushes, always -- usually 
flowering bushes, (inaudible) honeysuckle, things like that, 
because my mother liked those types of things. There was some 
Chinese Elms. 
Q. This is along the north side? 
A. On the north side. 
Q. Why do you remember those bushed being there? 
A. Because we always had to cut them back when the 
overlapped on Mary's lawn. 
We all had a love of flowers, and we always loved the 
springtime when the flowers would -- you know, because that's why 
we had them. We liked the spring flowers -- you know, they 
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always bloomed in the spring and it was very pretty. Our place 
was just covered with flowers all the time. 
Q. What is your earliest recollection of seeing those 
flowers bloom along the fence line? How old would you say you 
were? 
A. Well, I can remember having pictures taken when I was 
only maybe two and a half, three. I remember the flowers then. 
You know, the bushes were -- when I was small, the 
trees were pretty small. 
Q. These are the trees along the north where the fence is? 
A. Uh-huh, but there was a definite line that went back, 
and then there was always a fence -- the metal fence with the 
posts that went all the way back to the back where we used to 
have sheep. It used to be in grass and then it was a garden 
after I was a little older. 
Q. Did your property or your parents' property ever extend 
beyond the fence line on the north? 
A. Never. 
Q. Did you or your family ever consider that you owned 
property beyond the fence line? 
A. No. And once you crossed the row of trees you were on 
Aunt Mary's property, and then on the south it was the Hawthorne 
trees next to the ditch. 
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Q. And so you believed or your knowledge was that was the 
area that your family owned? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did Mary care for the property on the north side of the 
fence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did she do? 
A. She mowed the grass, watered it, and the water lines --
you know, it came from the reservoir, and sometimes she would be 
up all night watering and you could always hear the click of the 
water heads. It was just something that was always there. She 
planted flowers. 
When I was younger we had --we used to play there all 
the time. I mean we had rock gardens and frog ponds, I mean that 
was -- all the cousins, that's what we did, we had frog ponds and 
we go hunt frogs. The peacocks and the turkeys and -- I mean it 
was just there, that was just Aunt Mary's and this was ours. 
Q. And the fence line and the tree line divided it? 
A. That was a definite line, yes. 
Q. And is that same line there today? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When was the last time you were on the property? 
A. Just a little while ago, just maybe a week ago we were-
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Q. Have you periodically been on the property during your 
life? 
A. All the time, because that's just like our home. I 
mean Aunt Mary is our family. 
Q. Has that fence line and tree line been there your whole 
life? 
A. Always, my entire life. 
Q. Including today? 
A. Including today. 
Q. And the location of the tree line and the fence line is 
the same today as it was when you were growing up? 
A. It is the same. The trees are bigger, but the fence 
line is still there, and it's just there. 
Q. When was it that you left the property? 
A. I was 18 when I got married. 
Q. And the fence line was still there? 
A. And I was there through my whole life, graduated from 
high school, got married, and then I moved, but I was there most 
of the time anyway. You go back home, that's your home. 
Page 0493 Line 22 
Q. What's your earliest memory of that what you call the 
fence line there or the border line there? How old were you? 
A. As long as I could -- was early enough to remember. 
11 
Q. How old would that be? 
A. Two and a half, maybe. I can remember having my 
picture taken, because I was with my brother's dog, Toby. I can 
remember that distinctly. 
Q. How big were the trees then? 
A. Well, say if this was ground level, just little. You 
know, they were not that big, just little. 
Q. And there were bushed there? 
A. There were bushes, they were planted. There were some 
bushes that were put in. I think they got them from Stole's 
Nursery down in American Fork. 
Q. What kind of a fence was it? 
A. A heavy wire fence like you would use on a farm, a farm 
fence with T-posts. 
Q. There wasn't amu barbed wire? 
A. We didn't have barbed wire on our fence that I 
remember. 
Q. How long did you live there? 
A. Until I was 18. I graduated from high school in --
Q. Did you ever see them change the fence or fix the fence 
(inaudible) the fence during the time you were there? 
A. Pardon? 
Q. Did you ever see them change the fence or fix the fence 
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while you were there? 
A. It has never changes. The only time it ever needed to 
be fixed is when we -- all us kids would climb over and kind of 
mash it down a little bit, and it had to be pulled back up. 
4. The next witness was Wendell Hansen who was born in 
Defendant Mary Pulley's home in 1924. (R. at 0496) He lived 
there until 1944, then moved into Plaintiff's home a few years 
later where he lived for four more years. (R. at 0497) Mr. 
Hansen now lives on part of the old Pulley farm. (R. at 0497) 
Mr. Hansen testified about the boundary between the properties. 
(Quote R. at line 2 through 0500 line 11) (0501 line 12 to 0502 
line 20 (0503 line 17 through 0504 line 8) 
Page 0499 Line 2 
Q. Was there ever a division between his property and rest 
of the farm? 
A. Always was. 
Q. What kind of a division? 
A. There was a fence in the back end and the front end, it 
was shrubbery and the trees. 




Q. About when was that, do you know? 
A. Probably from about 1950 on. 
Q. Did you ever have occasion to go back and forth between 
the two properties? 
A. Yes, I did very much, yes. 
Q. Why would you? 
A. Well, I used to live in the basement, I used to go out 
and visit my mother. In fact, I remember even jumping the fence 
in the back end going up to visit my mother. 
Q. How old would you have been then? 
A. I'd have been 22 to 24. 
Q. Did your mother reside with Mary Pulley her whole life? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you were married was she living there? 
A. When I got married she was living there. She lived 
there until she died. 
Q. From when to when would she have lived there? 
A. Well, she would have lived there from birth until 
death. 
Q. So how old was she when she died? 
A. Eighty-three. 
Q. So she lived there 83 years. 
A. Right. 
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Page 0501 Line 12 
Q. Did you ever see Mary care for the property -- her 
property that extended to the fence line? 
A. You bet. 
Q. What did you see her do? 
A. She did all the work on what we called her property, 
and that was that area between the old Pulley home and Adolphus. 
Q. Right up to the tree line? 
A. Right up to the tree line. 
Q. And the tree line consists of those pine trees that are 
there now? 
A. Right. Actually now there's a combination fence, it's 
a wire fence with -- in fact, it's too high now. She used to 
have so much problems with plaintiff's dogs that -- in fact, Aunt 
Mary accused her of cutting holes in the fence to let the dogs 
through, and that's why she lost all of her birds. She used to 
have guinea hens -- they all got killed off. 
They came up and they would get in her garbage and move 
the garbage around and then go out and mess all over her lawn, 
and there were just -- she did not have good feelings toward 
Christine. 
Q. How long has Mary been caring for that area up to the 
fence? 
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A. Ever since it was deeded to her. 
Q. Up until what point in time? She doesn't still care 
for it, does she? 
A. Well, she still supervises. Now she's mentally 
incapacitated, but up until that time, yes, I would say about 
until 1994 she took really good care of it. 
Q. Up until about 1994? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Page 0503 Line 17 
Q. The fence that's there today and the tree line that's 
there today, is that approximately on the same location as the 
boundary line that you understood it to be since you were a boy? 
A. I think it's exactly on the boundary line. Out in 
front she used to take -- during when she had her Christmas 
display, she used to put a new fence up every year during that 
time. And then it got to the point that people would just keep 
kind of driving in — in fact, a four wheel drive truck come 
through there one time and ended up right over in her lot, and it 
forced her to put up this chain link fence. And that was not put 
up by the American Fork City, that was put up by Mary Pulley. 
Q. You're talking about the fence along this side? 
A. Right, on the road. 
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APPENDIX I I 
MARSHALLING ON PLAINTIFF'S THIRD ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff's third issue on appeal is "Whether the district 
court improperly found that the two properties were adjoining, 
and improperly concluded that boundary by acquiescence had been 
established, where the two properties are not adjoining according 
to legal description." This issue is at least initially a 
challenge of a finding of fact. Because plaintiff failed to 
marshal the evidence on this point, defendants have done so as 
follows: 
1. Defendant's first witness regarding whether the 
properties are adjoining was Brian Allred. Mr. Allred surveyed 
the property, and testified regarding the effect of the various 
deeds, the creation of the description gap, and the fact that the 
properties were adjoining. (Quote R. at 0404 line 15 to 0406 
line 18) (0408 line 4 to 0416 line 9) 
Page 0404 Line 15 
Q. Let me show you another deed that we'd like to submit 
for admission. This is a deed from Andrew Pulley to Adolphus 
Pulley, isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Does it say on there the date? 
A, Yeah, January 9, 1935. That was the recording date 
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that looks like. 
Q. That was Andrew Pulley to Adolphus Pulley, is that what 
it says on there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And about how much was that, the acreage? 
A. It says one acre, "area 1.00 acre." 
Q. And have you indicated -- did you on this particular 
graph, did you -- have you mapped out where that particular plot 
of property would be? 
A. The legal description, yes. 
Q. And where would that be? 
A. Well, it extends north of the fence line. 
Q. Would it be right here, this line that I'm tracing with 
my finger, that's indicated by the Stokes, the 2 (inaudible) word 
"Stokes" up here north? The solid line with a dot? 
A. Going from the line where it says, "Boley, " the line 
north of that up to the line that's north of the fence line. 
Q. And the fence line is indicated by what? 
A. Little x's through the end of the line. 
Q. So that solid line about the Stokes word that has the 
little x's? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. So you're saying that this acre deeded to Adolphus by 
Andrew is indicated by the dotted line about the word "Boley," to 
the dotted line above Stokes? 
A. Yeah, indicated by a long dot, long dot. 
Q. So before any of these divisions now, when Andrew 
Pulley received the approximately 84 acres from the 
Featherstones, did that include both the Adolphus Pulley or the 
Stokes property and the Mary Pulley property where the home is 
and the few acres? 
A. Yes, it included them both with the exception of a 
little overlap there at the top -- underlap, whatever. 
Q. And so all of this area within the pink was one piece 
of property? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And you've been in the courthouse today, and we've 
talked about the disputed piece that the plaintiff is claiming, 
we've talked about some property gaps, et cetera? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. And this one piece of property includes all of those 
areas, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Page 0408 Line 4 
Q. The area that's highlighted in blue on this particular 
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exhibit, what does that indicate? 
A. This fence line around the Mary Pulley's property. 
Q. And this at the bottom here above the word, "Stokes," 
os the fence line (inaudible) we've received testimony on today? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Between the Stokes property and the Pulley property? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. And then there is a little blue line down here at the 
bottom above the word, "drive." Is that a fence line also? 
A. It is. 
Q. Then we have another line that's green. What does that 
indicate? 
A. That's the Mary Pulley legal description. 
Q. And then this long dotted line in yellow, what is that? 
A. That's the Stokes legal description. 
Q. And then these other dotted line that aren't colored, 
they are just other deeds? 
A. Surrounding deeds, yes. 
MR. STIRLAND: I'd like to offer that into evidence, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Any objection to 7? 
MR. LOW: No. 
THE COURT: Very w e l l , 7 i s r e c e i v e d . ( E x h i b i t No. 7 
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received into evidence) 
THE WITNESS: I think technically that (inaudible) one at 
the north is a right-of-way. I can't remember now. 
Q. MR. STIRLAND: That is not at issue. There's an area 
here between the yellow line on this particular exhibit and the 
green line. 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. What is that area? 
A. Description gap. 
Q. Description gap? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Over here on our first exhibit we have here one deed, 
and it includes all this property, correct? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. The deed from Featherstone to Andrew Pulley? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. But yet now, looking at the Mary Pulley deed and the 
Stokes property, we have a description gap between the two 
properties? 
A. Right. 
Q. In an area that was once one property? 
A. Apparently. 
Q. Do you have any idea what would have caused that 
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description gap? 
MR. LOW: Objection, your Honor, foundation first as to 
how he would know. I don't object to his testimony, I just want 
to make sure we know how he knows before he (inaudible) . 
THE COURT: All right, I'll sustain the objection. 
Q. MR. STIRLAND: Let me just lay a little bit of 
foundation, okay? 
A. Sure. 
Q. What is your degree, your advanced degree? Do you have 
an advanced degree? 
A. I have a degree in English and one in mechanical 
engineering. 
Q. And you're employed as the -- what was it again? 
A. Property survey manager. 
Q. For Daley & Associates? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you're responsible for directing surveys and then 
mapping out those -- that information? 
A. I collect the field data and put it on a computer and 
then take the legal descriptions and put it on a computer, match 
them up and try to determine where the property line should be. 
Q. Do you have any experience or knowledge relating to 
gaps in property descriptions or plat maps? 
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A. Yes, we quite often see them. Most people think that 
it's a legal description, it's cast in iron, and as far as it 
goes it is. But we often see gaps between properties. 
Q. When you say, "we," meaning? 
A. Well, myself and other people that work in the office. 
I'm not the only one who puts in things on the computer. 
Q. So by the nature of your employment and the company 
that you work for, you've had the opportunity to study legal 
descriptions and gaps and how they occur? 
A. Yes. 
MR. STIRLAND: Is that enough? 
Mr. LOW: What's your question going to be? 
MR. STIRLAND: My next question is going to be, "do you 
have an opinion as to why there's a gap in this particular area?" 
Mr. LOW: Maybe (inaudible) he's there, and does he 
know any history (inaudible). 
Q. MR. STIRLAND: Are you familiar with particular area of 
the maps and plats and the legal descriptions of this area. 
A. Yes. 
Q. We've gone through all the deeds, the Pulley deeds, the 
Andrew to Adolphus deed. We've gone through the Featherstone to 
the Andrew Pulley deed, we've gone from the Andrew Pulley deed to 
the Mary Pulley deed, correct? 
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A. Yeah. 
Q. And you've read all those and you've calculated all 
those out, correct? 
A. Yeah, from the records and physical things, yeah. 
Q. Could you tell us, in your opinion, why there would be 
a gap here between the yellow property and the green property? 
A. I see it quite often. It's mainly because when they --
this is just based on how evidence stacks up later on, a section 
is an ideal entity. It's supposed to be one mile by one mile. 
And when surveyors came out to do the original subdividing into 
sections, to take a township and divide it into sections, that's 
what they're shooting for. 
But for one reason or another, my assumption is 
inaccuracies in their instruments, the sections are never ever 
exactly one mile by one mile. Around here I see mostly they are 
a little bigger, and so you've got a section that's supposed to 
be one mile on each side and it's actually got an additional --
well, sometimes it's smaller, but often -- mostly it's bigger 
around here, 30 to 70 feet or whatever. 
Q. So typically how would surveyors, when they came into a 
township, how would they mark out a section of property? I mean, 
would they place markers? 
A. Well, yes, they put markers at the corners. 
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Q. And they would measure from that area, typically, from 
most points? 
A. Yeah. And from then on the descriptions refer to the 
markers, the monuments, the actual -- now they put in brass 
tacks, originally that put in stone mounds. Our county is very 
good at mapping those and recording where they sit in reality to 
each other. 
Q. And once in this particular area, the section was 
measured and the monuments or the markers were established, then 
if there was any activity as far as selling or transferring or 
dividing the property, it would refer to those markers, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So how is it, then, that we get the gap here, in your 
opinion? 
A. Well, as I was saying, the Stokes' property is called 
from the west quarter corner-
ed. Would that be down--
A. Which is half way between the northwest corner and the 
southwest corner -- I mean approximately half. It is where it 
is. And then the Pulley property is called from the center 
section, which is -- well, there is no monument there, you have 
to calculate that. 
Q. So you're saying that the legal description for the 
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Pulley deed and the legal description for the Stokes deed, they 
didn't start necessarily from the same corners? 
A. Right. 
Q. They started from different corners? 
A. Right. 
Q. And how would that have resulted in a gap, or how would 
that affect the legal descriptions? 
A. Well, if the markers are longer than the --
theoretical, I think, for a half of it is 400,200 -- whatever it 
is -- it's feet. If the distance is greater than it is in 
theory, and they haven't had a surveyor out there to see and 
indicate that, and they are writing it from the theory, then that 
would pull them apart -- pull the descriptions apart, because 
from a theoretical corner on the other side, in reality they are 
further apart then they are supposed to be, and that would pull 
them apart. 
Q. Even though they might be adjacent pieces of property, 
the legal descriptions started from different corners could 
result in the gap? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But it is your testimony that at one time, at least in 
1887, that entire area was one piece of property? 
A. By the Featherstone, yes. 
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Q. Yes, by the Featherstone, Andrew Pulley deed? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. In your review of this area and the legal descriptions, 
did you notice any other, or come across any other deeds to 
individuals of property in this area except for Andrew to Mary, 
Andrew to Adolphus and then Adolphus Pulley to the Madsens and 
then the Boyers and then the Stokes and McCrimmons? 
A. No, I didn't notice anybody else involved in that. 
2. The evidence marshalled above regarding mutual 
acquiescence would also go to whether the properties are 
adjoining. Because that evidence is marshalled above, it will 
not be repeated. 
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APPENDIX III 
550 line 8 to 551 line 5: 
Well, that's now. The second requirement is that the mutual 
acquiescence in the line as a boundary. Okay, so there's two 
elements of this requirement, too. There's mutual acquiescence, 
and in treating the line as a boundary. 
In the mutual acquiescence facet of it, the way I interpret 
that -- I think that's appropriate is that they both agree that 
that's a boundary, or should be treated as a boundary. 
Now for years, I guess, that land was owned by Pulleys on 
both sides of it, and it didn't seem to ever become an argument 
as to whether who owned what. But it certainly doesn't match up 
to those cases where -- for example, in one case -- this was 
proven because the party on one side of the fence tried to buy 
the land on the other side of the fence, an so the Court decided, 
"Well, that's obviously acquiescing because they thought it was 
the other person's land so they tried to buy it." 
Well, that didn't happen here. There's been no admission by 
anybody that they did not own that land on the other side. 
Again, it was Pulleys on both sides of that land. 
R. at 102-101 in pertinent part: 
2. There has never been mutual acquiescence in the fence 
line boundary. 
As stated above, defendant Pulley had knowledge of the true 
boundary. Certainly, Ms. Stokes has known the boundary since 
1979, or at worse, 1989. Ms. Stokes has watered the property and 
attempted to build fences on the property. In addition, Ms. 
Stokes has continually paid taxes on the property. In 1990, as 
can be seen by the tax receipts and records, the property was 
split for tax purposes. Ms. Stokes actually pays a separate tax 
bill on the disputed property. The tax bill comes to the 
plaintiff's address in the plaintiff's name. None of these facts 
are disputed by the defendants. There has never been mutual 
acquiescence in the fence line as the boundary. 
The law requires mutual acquiescence, In this case, neither 
side has acquiesced. Defendant Pulley effectively used the land 
through a lease and is now claiming ownership. This is improper 
and does not meet the requirements of the boundary by 
acquiescence doctrine. The plaintiff has stated that she has 
never conceded that the fence line was the boundary. Therefore, 
mutual acquiescence is impossible, and the plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment should be granted. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRISTINA R. STOKES, 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
vs. : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
MARY J. PULLEY, WENDELL : 
HANSEN, CAMILLE FOWLER, JIM 
FOWLER, TRAVIS HANSEN, TROY : Civil No. 940400337 
HANSEN, AND REGAN HANSEN, (Judge Harding) 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court for a non-jury trial on the 
21st day of March, 1996, the Honorable Ray M. Harding, District 
Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was present and represented by 
Thomas L. Low and Defendants were represented by T. McKay Stirland. 
Having heard the evidence presented and counsels' arguments and 
being fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby enters the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and incorporates 
herein by reference its Memorandum Decision dated April 12, 1996: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In 1887, Thomas and Emma Featherstone deeded 
approximately 84 acres of real estate in American Fork, Utah to 
r 
Andrew Pul ley, father of Defendant Mary Pu l l ey . The property i s 
more p a r t i c u l a r l y described a s : 
Begin at the center of Sec t ion 18, T. 5, S.R. 2. E. then 
running West 32.72 chains, t hen North 16.00 chains, then West 
7.28 chains, then North 10.00 chains then East 25.00 chains , 
then South 6.50 chains, then East 15.00 chains, then South 
20.00 chains to the place of beg inn ing . Area 85 acres and 40 
rods of land. All in t h i s N.W. 1/4 and Lots 2, Section 18, T. 
5, S.R. 2. E. Salt Lake Meridian United States Survey, Utah 
County, Terr i tory of Utah. 
(Here inaf ter referred to as "the Andrew Pu l l ey property.") 
2. In 1934, Andrew Pulley deeded approximately one acre of 
h i s land to his son, Adolphus Pu l l ey . The one acre i s more 
p a r t i c u l a r l y described a s : 
Beginning 16.50 chains North of the Southwest corner of the 
Northwest quarter of Sect ion 18, Township 5 South, Range 2 
East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 2.50 
chains East 4.00 chains; thence South 2.50 chains; thence West 
4.00 chains to the place of beg inn ing . Area 1.0 acres 
(Here inaf te r referred to as "the P l a i n t i f f ' s property.") 
3 . The approximate one acre p a r c e l deeded to Adolphus Pulley 
from Andrew Pulley i s the same p a r c e l which i s presently owned by 
P l a i n t i f f . 
4 . The property immediately no r th of and adjacent to the 
P l a i n t i f f ' s property remained p a r t of the o r ig ina l Andrew Pulley 
p r o p e r t y a f t e r Andrew Pulley deeded the one acre parcel to Adolphus 
Pu l l ey . 
5. In 1946, Andrew Pul ley deeded approximately 75.85 acres 
of h i s proper ty to his daughter, Defendant Mary Pulley, which was 
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n Q i n 
more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the center of Section 18, Township 5 South, Range 
2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 27.15 chains; 
thence North 33 1' East 12.58 chains; thence South 85 56' West 
6.18 chains; thence North 4.58 chains; thence West 3.28 
chains; thence North 2.50 chains; thence West 4.00 chains; 
thence North 7.00 chains; thence East 25.00 chains; thence 
South 6.50 chains; thence East 15.00 chains; thence South 
20.00 chains to place of beginning. Area 75.85 acres more or 
less. 
(Hereinafter referred to as "the Defendant's property.") 
6. Part of Defendant's 75.85 acre property was immediately 
north of and adjacent to Plaintiff's property. 
7. In the 1940s, trees and bushes were planted and a fence 
erected along the tree and bush line between Plaintiff's and 
Defendant's properties. The fence/tree line marked the boundary 
line between the Plaintiff's property on the north and the 
Defendant's property on the south. 
8. From at least 1946 to 1979--some 33 years--Adolphus 
Pulley and each succeeding owner of the Plaintiff's property from 
Adolphus Pulley to Charles and Xenna Boyer considered and 
acquiesced to the fence/tree line as the boundary line between the 
Plaintiff's and the Defendant's properties. 
9. From at least 1946 to 1979--some 33 years--Defendant Mary 
Pulley considered and acquiesced to the fence/tree line as the 
boundary line between the Plaintiff's and the Defendant's 
properties. 
10. From 1946 to present, Defendant Mary Pulley has occupied, 
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possessed, maintained and cared for the property immediately north 
of the fence/tree line. 
11. From 1946 to present, Defendant Mary Pulley has used the 
property immediately north of the fence/tree line for family and 
community events. 
12. For at least 33 years prior to Plaintiff's ownership of 
her property, the fence/tree line established the boundary line 
between the parties' properties. 
13. The fence/tree line between the parties' properties has 
been clearly visible since at least 1946. 
14. On March 19, 1979, the Plaintiff and Roderick McCrimmon 
purchased from Charles and Xenna Boyer the one acre parcel 
originally owned by Adolphus Pulley and identified herein as the 
Plaintiff's property. 
15. On May 23, 1979, Roderick McCrimmon deeded his interest 
in the Plaintiff's property to the Plaintiff. 
16. On March 19, 1979 or sometime thereafter, Plaintiff came 
to believe that her one acre property extended "twenty plus" feet 
to the north of the fence/tree line between Plaintiff's and 
Defendant' s properties. 
17. The legal description of Plaintiff's property places her 
northern boundary line approximately 43 feet immediately to the 
north of the fence/tree line between Plaintiff's and Defendant's 
properties. 
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18. A comparison of the legal descriptions of Plaintiff's and 
Defendant's properties shows that the respective deeds 
unintentionally created a narrow description gap between the 
parties' properties to the north and east of the Plaintiff's 
property. 
19. The parties' legal descriptions were created from two 
different marker points of beginning which resulted in the 
description gap. 
20. The narrow strip of land creating the description gap 
between the parties' properties was an unintentional and mistaken 
result of the property description process. 
21. Although surveys and legal descriptions show a gap 
between the parties' properties, the gap was originally part of the 
Andrew Pulley property which was subsequently transferred to 
Defendant Mary Pulley. 
22. Upon Andrew Pulley's transfer to Defendant Mary Pulley of 
his property, Adolphus and his sister Defendant Mary Pulley became 
adjoining landowners on the north side of Plaintiff's property. 
23. Plaintiff's property and Defendant's property have been 
adjoining and are adjoining lots from 193 6 to present. 
24. No evidence was presented showing that any of the 
Defendants committed any act of trespass against the Plaintiff. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that under the 
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doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, property rights are 
determined based upon actual possession of land. 
2. The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that Defendant 
Pulley must prove boundary by acquiescence by showing: (1) 
occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences or 
buildings; (2) mutual acquiescence to the line as a boundary; (3) 
for a long period of time, generally not less than 20 years; (4) by 
adjoining land owners. 
3. The Court concludes, as si matter of law, that once 
Defendant Mary Pulley has established each element of boundary by 
acquiescence then she is entitled to a presumption of ownership. 
4. Defendant Mary Pulley has, as a matter of law, proven and 
established her (1) occupation of the disputed property up to a 
visible line marked by fence, trees and bushes; (2) mutual 
acquiescence to the line as a boundary by all property owners from 
at least 1946 to 1979; (3) for at least 33 years; (4) by adjoining 
land owners. 
5. From 1946 to present, the Defendant Mary Pulley has 
occupied the disputed area up to a line marked by trees, bushes and 
fence. 
6. From at least 1946 to 1979--some 33 years—the owners of 
Plaintiff's property and Defendant's property mutually agreed that 




7. The narrow strip of land shown as a description gap 
between the parties' property was an unintentional and mistaken 
result of the property description process. 
8. Plaintiff's property and Defendant's property have been 
and are adjoining parcels of property from 1934 to present. 
9. The property extending south to the fence/tree line on 
the northern side of Plaintiff's property, including the narrow 
strip of property shown as a description gap, shall be quieted in 
favor of Defendant Mary Pulley. 
10. The Plaintiff's deed and the Defendant's deed shall be 
reformed to conform with the existing fence/tree line. 
11. Defendant Mary Pulley's deed shall be reformed to conform 
with the existing configuration of the property on which she 
resides, occupies and maintains, according to the fence line 
surrounding her property, specifically, the trees, bushes, and 
fencing bordering her property to the south shall be the southern 
boundary line of her property. 
12. Plaintiff's deed shall be reformed to conform with the 
existing configuration of the property on which she resides 
according to the fence line surrounding her property, specifically, 
the trees, bushes, and fencing bordering her property to the north 
shall be the northern boundary line of her property. 





c o s t s . 
The Plaintiff i s not e n t i t l e d to damages for trespass. 
Each party shal l bear t h e i r own attorneys' fees and 
DATED t h i s pL} day of ^%%, 
BY 
996, 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 




I hereby certify that I hand-delivered a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to the following this / day of May, 1996: 
Thomas L. Low 
3507 N. University Avenue 
Suite 370 
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CASE NO. 940400337 
DATE: April 12, 1996 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Larry Meyers 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court for a nonjury trial on March 21, 1996. The 
Plaintiff was present and represented by Thomas L. Low. The Defendant was present and 
represented by McKay Stirland. Having heard the evidence and counsels' arguments, the 
Court hereby rules as follows. 
Factual Background 
The parties in this case are neighbors, residing to the east of 4800 West in American 
Fork, Utah County, Utah. The Plaintiff has brought this action to quiet title to a section of 
real property along a boundary of the parties1 properties. 
In 1887, Thomas and Emma Featherstone deeded approximately 84 acres of real estate 
in American Fork, Utah, to Andrew Pulley. In 1935, Andrew Pulley deeded approximately 
one acre of his land [hereinafter referred to as "the Plaintiffs propertyM] to his son, Adolphus 
Pulley. In 1946, Andrew Pulley deeded approximately 75.85 acres of his land [hereinafter 
referred to as "the Defendant's property"] to his daughter, the Defendant in this case. The 
Defendant's property lies to the north and to the east of the Plaintiffs property. The disputed 
boundary is the northern line of the Plaintiffs property. 
At some point during the 1940s, trees and bushes were planted, and a fence was 
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erected along the tree line, to mark the boundary line between the Plaintiffs property on the 
north and the Defendant's property on the south. From then until 1979, each succeeding 
owner of the Plaintiffs property-from Adolphus Pulley to Charles and Xenna Boyer-
considered the fence/tree line to be the boundary between the two lots. And from 1946 to the 
present, the Defendant has maintained and cared for the property to the north of the tree\fence 
line. She has also used that area for family and community events. 
On March 19, 1979, the Plaintiff and Roderick McCrimmon purchased from the 
Boyers the one acre lot that had originally belonged to Adolphus Pulley. At that time or at 
some later date, the Plaintiff came to believe that her property extended "twenty plus" feet 
north of the tree\fence line. On May 23, 1979, Mr. McCrimmon deeded his interest in the 
property to the Plaintiff. 
Supporting the Plaintiffs belief that her property extends beyond the tree\fence line is 
the fact that the legal description of the Plaintiffs property places her northern boundary 
approximately 43 feet to the north of the tree\fence line. Adding to the confusion, a 
comparison of the legal descriptions of the parties1 properties shows that the respective deeds 
unintentionally created a narrow strip of land dividing the parties1 properties on the north and 
east of the Plaintiffs property. The discrepancy was caused because the two legal 
descriptions were created beginning at two different marker points. 
The Plaintiff asks the Court to quiet title to a 43-foot-wide strip of property north of 
the tree\fence line in her favor. The Plaintiff also requests damages for a tree in the disputed 
area which, after being toppled by a microburst wind, was allegedly cut up and hauled away 
by the Defendant and the co-defendants in this case. 
The Defendant responds that the Court should quiet title, under the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence, by declaring the tree\fence line to be the southern boundary of that 
portion of her property which is contingent to the Plaintiffs property. 
Opinion of the Court 
Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, property rights are determined based 
on actual possession of land. Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 
145, 147 (1973). The party seeking to prove boundary by acquiescence must show: (1) 
occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences or buildings; (2) mutual 
acquiescence to the line as a boundary; (3) for a long period of time, generally not less than 
20 years; (4) by adjoining landowners. Stoker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1990); 
Englert v. Zone, 848 P.2d 165, 168 (Utah App. 1993). Once that party has established each 
element, the party is entitled to a presumption of ownership. Englert, 848 P.2d at 169; Fuoco 
v. Williams, All P.2d 944, 946 (Utah 1966). 
The Court finds that the Defendant has shown boundary by acquiescence. From 1946 
until the present, the Defendant occupied the disputed area up to the line marked by the trees, 
bushes, and fence. From at least 1946 to 1979—some 33 years—the owners of the two lots 
mutually agreed that the tree\fence line was the boundary. Finally, as the Court finds that the 
creation of a narrow strip of land between the two properties was an unintentional and 
mistaken result of the property description process, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs 
property and the Defendant's property have been and are adjoining lots. Cf Affleck v. 
Morgan, 12 Utah 2d 200, 203-04 (Utah 1961) ("When a section line is discovered to be in 
error it does not mean that the landowners must readjust their property lines to conform to the 
resurvey."). 
Based on the Defendant's showing, the Court hereby quiets title in favor of the 
Defendant by holding that the Defendant's property extends south to the tree/fence line on the 
northern side of the Plaintiffs property. The Defendant's and Plaintiffs deeds shall be 
reformed to conform with the existing tree/fence line. The Court further holds that the 
Plaintiff is not entitled to damages for trespass. Each party is to bear its own attorney's fees. 
Order 
Counsel for the Defendant is to prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an 
order of Judgment within 15 days of this decision consistent with and in support of the terms 
of this memorandum and submit those documents to opposing counsel for approval as to form 
prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no effect until 
such are signed by the Court. 
Dated this 12th day of April, 1996. 
cc: T. McKay Stirland, Esq. 
Thomas L. Low, Esq. 
